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The Modern Construction of Myth 
by Andrew Von Hendy 
Boston College 
When it comes to myth, the student in any given discipline is apt to be 
in the position of the six blind men in the ancient Hindu fable who define the 
elephant according to the particular part each has happened to touch. My 
first goal in this essay is to cope with the whole elephant, to set the 
contributions of the various disciplines which study myth into significant 
relation withoneanothersoas toproduceaninterdisciplinaryoverview. The 
six blind men, however, apprehend a single, concrete object, whereas the 
student of "myth" confronts a concept which has been and still is the site of 
contending ideological constructions, many of them connected only quite 
problematically to any objective referent.1 My second goal is therefore to 
make clear the extent to .which such constructions have shaped thinking 
about myth, often to the inhibition of interdisciplinary understanding. These 
two objectives, particularly in combination, require not merely synchronic 
but also diachronic explanation. As a consequence. much of the essay is cast 
as an historical "genealogy," in the sense derived from Nietzsche and made 
current by Michel Foucault. The history of the concept is not rehearsed for 
its own sake, but examined for its power to shed light upon the ideological 
constructions which bedevil the study of myth in our own time. This effort 
may be said to constitute the third goal of the essay, and my fourth and final 
one grows out of the third. In the last few pages, hoping that the prior 
genealogy has equipped me with at least one eye, however bleary, I advance 
another definition of the elephant and suggest how the construction of myth 
in modem anthropology might serve as a check on the various fonns of 
Romantic ideology which have otherwise dominated th~ field. 
I 
By "modern," in my title, I mean the kind of thinking about myth which 
began, roughly, with the eighteenth century. Premodem thinking about the 
concept can be represented by Francis Bacon in the previous century. His 
work offers a dramatic instance of the divide between the old and the new 
conceptions of myth because he grasped the new without quite knowing that 
he had. On the one hand, when he speaks of what he considers to be myth, 
the mythology of classical antiquity, in his essay "On the Wisdom of the 
Ancients," he conceives of it in the two-millenia-old Neoplatonic tradition as 
allegorized fable, moral teaching concealed under the bait of fantasy (Bacon, 
XIII, 67-172). On the other hand, when he distinguishes in his New Organon 
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the four genera of illusions which interfere with clear thinking, the idols of the 
tribe, the cave, the marketplace and the theater, he describes phenomena 
which characterize, when taken compositely, what many in our day would 
mean by myth (Bacon, vm, 76-78). It does not occur to Bacon to associate the 
universal illusion-spinning of the race with the fables of the gods; this 
association, conclusive for the modern construction of myth, becomes current 
only in the next century. 
The word "construction" in my title indicates that the meaning of a 
concept such as myth, is, like all meaning, culturally constructed, however 
"natural" it may appear within a given ideological context. We can see 
"myth" being cut out of whole cloth in the rourse of the eighteenth century. 
The French elas5icist, Marcel Detienne, suggests that the first systematic 
students of traditional story, in that century, reinvented Plato's concept of 
myth as part of their own war, analogous to his, against superstition. The 
historian of ideas, Frank Manuel, documented a generation ago in The 
Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods the extent to which the foremost 
mythographers of the day consciously or unronsciously projected in their 
workcontemporaryconcernsabouttheoriginandnatureofreligion. Wecan 
see this tendency at work already in the first important modern es.say on 
"myth," thephilosophe, Jean Fontenelle' s "On the Origin of Fables," published 
in 1724 (though probably written in the 1690s). As Robert Richardson 
observes, Fontenelle tries out nearly every theory of myth known to the later 
century .2 Two features of his syncretistic es.say, however, stamp itas modem 
in contradistinction to Bacon's. The first of these is his as5umption that the 
invention of fables is a constant of the human mind at a certain cultural level. 
Fontenelle, interested in the covert undermining of Christian revelation, 
regards this constant negatively; fables display, not "the wisdom of the 
ancients," but the perennial folly of human fantasy. ''Let us not look for 
anything in the fables except the history of the errors of the human mind 
(Fontenelle,18)." In order to demonstrate the universality of this condition 
he introduces the second . modern feature of the essay, its embryonic 
comparative method. Here, in the same year as Lafitau, who is so often 
credited in histories of anthropology with pioneering the method, Fontenelle 
deliberately compares Greek mythology with those reported from the New 
World, while Christian fable, (just as in Frazer's Golden Bough), hovers in the 
background as the shadowy, unmentionable third. This serond feature of the 
essayisareminderthattheriseofmodemmythographyiscontemporaneous 
with the appearance of anthropology itself. 
Fontenelle'snegativeattitudetowardfablereflectshisownanti-religious 
agenda and represents the atheistic strain in Enlightenment thought But this 
strain became rapidly locked into dialectical conflict with its rontrary, the 
growing valoriz.ation of fable. Just as the century is marked both by mass 
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defections from Christian belief and by denunciations Qf the triviality of 
allegorized classical mythology, it displa~ a steady rise in ~ for ~ 
power of the human mind to construct for itself the tables of its own belief. 
In a recent and brilliant encyclopedia article on French mythography of the 
eighteenth century, Jean Starobinsld sums up his findings with the 
epigrammatic remark ''In the intellectual history of the century, the 
sacraliz.ation of myth is strictly tnbutary to the humaniz.ation of the sacred 
(363)." If Fontenelle inaugurates and serves as an instance of the negative 
critique of fable, Vico, whose New Science was published only a year later, 
may be said to introduce and prefigure its positive affinnation. If one looks 
at Vico without wearing the spectacles designed for the purpose by various 
nineteenth and twentieth centwy Romantic interpreters, he appears, like 
Bacon, as an interestingly ambiguous and ambivalent transitional figure. On 
the one hand, his view of the civility of primeval humankind, thegiganti of his 
FirstAge,isasdarkasHobbes',andheshareswithFontenelleastadialtheory 
of metahistory acrording to which the race mercifully evolves toward 
civiliz.ed polish. On the other hand, once he achieved his radical insight that 
"the world of civil society was certainly made by men and ... its principles are 
to be found within the modifications of our own human mind," he felt 
compelled to recognize as a corollary that the humans of the Fll'St Age must 
have been "poets who spoke in poetical characters. This discovery, which is 
the master key of this Science, has cost us the persistent research of almost all 
our literary life, because with our civilized natures we cannot at all imagine 
and can understand only by great toil the poetic nature of the first men (21-
22, 96)." It follows, as Vico says in his opening section on method, "that the 
first science to be learned should be mythology or the interpretation of fables" 
(33). Hence, in his Book Two, ''Poetic Wisdom," which occupies half his text 
and is certainly the heart of i~ Vico deduces the categories of this poetry of 
foundational representations. Thisdeductionincludes, under''Poetic Logic," 
his brilliant analysis, not appreciated fully until the middle of our own 
century,of the fourmaster-tropesof original language. Thus, as the instances 
of Fontenelle and Vico suggest, fable, or, as it came increasingly to be called 
in the next generation, myth,shuttleddialectically between being represented 
as an outmoded record of error and as the key to human continuity. From 
either point of view, however, it became the constructed Other of 
Enlightenment 
By a familiar irony of intellectual history, the Romantic reaction to 
Enlightenmentmerelyconsolidatedmythas theOtherofWestemsecularism. 
The ''humanization of the sacred" and its roncomitant "sacralization of 
myth" complete their apotheosis, and create the modem excitement about 
"myth," only with Romantic representations of the positive value of 
mythopoeia. It may be useful to distinguish in this Romantic valorizing of 
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myth three moments, which I will call nostalgia, assertion and consolidation. 
One can illustrate the first of these by focussing on Schiller's immensely 
influential articulation of a concept for which T. S. Eliot provided the 
definitive literary label when he produced his own version of it and called it 
"dissociation of sensibility."3 The ancient Greeks were not like us, Schiller 
asserts in his essay "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry." Whereas we live in 
a modem, dissociated, "sentimental" condition of irony which undennines 
our powers of spontaneous belief, they lived in a "naive'' ro~tionof unified 
sensibility which enabled such belief. In his celebrated complementary 
poem, ''The Gods of Greece," Schiller's speaker exclaims in the first stanza, 
"wie ganz anders, anders war es da!", ''how wholly other, other was it there" 
(163).4 The serendipitous theological associations which have since accrued 
to this phrase are perfectly appropriate in the context In the succeeding 
stanz.as the speaker elaborates on this assertion. There there was no gap 
between subject and object; truth and poetry were one. Poetry wrapped only 
a magical transparenceabotitthethingsignifiedand thesignified poured the 
fulness of life through the verbal construction. There what will never more 
be felt, the unity of consciousness withitsintended object, was felt; nature was 
the presence of gods. In contrast to this, the second half of the poem is one 
long cry that the physical frame of things is now an abandoned place, 
incapable of counterresponse, "entgottete," a word it is tempting to translate 
anachronistically as" demystified," or ,in Weber' skeyphrase, "disenchanted." 
Schiller makes in clear in his essay that the unity of Greek imagination is the 
unity of unselfconscious simplicity. Modern humanity is truly superior to 
the ancients in the self-conscious quality of its affection for nature, but the 
price we pay is infinite longing for a state of rapport we cannot reclaim. One 
may beremindedofRousseau,agenerationearlier, stammeringparadoxically 
in his second Discourse about the original condition of man that it is "a state 
which no longer exists, which perhaps never existed, which probably never 
will exist, and yet about which it is neces.sary to have accurate notions" (34). 
I link Schiller with Rousseau here the better to suggest the relevance of 
Schiller's powerful and influential fiction to the rise of the modem social 
sciences. 'Thanks especially to some excellent recent work in the history of 
anthropology, it will not seem so farfetched to assert that this first, nostalgic 
momentofRomanticmythhashadapervasiveinfluenceinshapingWestern 
representations of the sacred among non-Western peoples.5 
This first moment of "nostalgia" ~wnes a West severed from a unified 
sensibility by nothing less than historical necessity; Schiller agrees implicitly 
with both Fontenelle and with Vico that the passage of the race into seH-
conscious separation from the cosmos was inevitable. But the second 
moment, the moment of high Romanticism proper, affirms that this fate can 
betransrendedbywayoftheindividual'svirtuallyinfinitepowertogenerate 
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mythopoeia. A great deai of work has been done in the past twenty years to 
elucidate the seminal roles of German Idealist philosophy after Kant and of 
theGermanandEnglishRomanticsinestablishingthemodem ''humanistic'' 
notion of a substantial ego which is the originating source of value, prior to 
society and (all too often) beyond historical conditioning.6 The moment of 
"assertion" in Romantic thinking about myth can be seen as a subset of this 
broader Romantic ideology. Doubly cut off from union with a society of 
believersand union with the cosmos, thecreativeindividualcan,nevertheless, 
evade the traps of a limiting rationality by both intuiting the pennanent 
truths embodied in past mythologies and perhaps even discovering or 
inventing the new one around which his or her own culture would at last 
cohere. (Notice the presupposition, which the Romantics inherited from 
Herder and popularized, that a mythology is a set of beliefs around which a 
"culture" coheres, while a "culture" (Herder's word) is a society organically 
unified by its mythology). . 
One might consider as instances three works published coincidentally 
in the year 1800. In the ''Talk on Mythology'' in Friedrich Schlegel' s Dialogue 
on Poetry, one of the most important theoretical documents o! ~ 
Romanticism, the speaker, Ludovico, calls for a "new mythology' which he 
identifies, ina famous pioneering description, with Romantic poetryitseH. In 
his System of Transcendental Phil~hy the Idealist philosopher Friedrich 
Schelling describes the epistemological mechanism bywhichmererationality 
could be evaded, namely· what has come to be called in literary history and 
theory "the Romantic symbol." He also initiates a project which w~ to 
occupy him for the rest of his long career, the development of a si:'rral 
philosophyofhistorycentered upon theevolutionofmyth. Totheessen~y 
backward-looking metahistorical theories of the eighteenth centwy, like 
Vico's or Schiller's, he adds a teleological dimension; just as a second age of 
"mythology'' mediated in the past between an initial age of "poetry'' (Viro' s 
''First Age") and our present age of "science," so a ·new age of "mythology'' 
willmediatetheutopianreturnoftheracetoanewageof "poetry(374)." And 
in "Klingsohr' s Fairytale" in his novel Heinrich von Ofterdingen the visionary 
poet Novalis invents a famous fable, an "internalized quest-romance of the 
sort written in England by Blake and Shelley) in which the adventures of his 
heroine, Fable, represent the power of mythopoeia radically to renovate 
human consciousness. 1 
The third moment of Romantic thinking about myth constitutes its 
entrenchment in nineteenth-century literary culture. It is marked especially 
by the widespread ensconcingof theRomanticsymbolandof the~~ption 
that the essence of myth is a permanent truth which transcends any particular 
historical vesture in which a story may be garbed. The Romantic concept of 
"symbol" is quite unlike the concept of it prevalent in the social sciences 
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which derives from positivistic semiology. The Romantic version refers to a 
sign the sum of whose meaning, so to speak, is greater than any logical 
analysisofits parts.8 This sign (for which James Joyce invented the relevantly 
religious name, "epiphany,") communicates to the person who apprehends 
ita directexperienceof transcendence. Coleridge, whosedescriptivedefinition 
of it is the best-known in English, says it is "characterized ... above all by the 
translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal (151)." Nineteenth 
century aesthetics builds on· this foundation in ~g a~ to the core of 
ahistorical truth beneath traditional story. Hence Tennyson, in retelling the 
Arthurian matter of Britain, or Wagner in dramatising Norse mythology in 
his Ring cycle, assumes that his "symbolic" version enable insights which 
both transcend the limitations of particular historical settin~ and exceed 
whatever specific allegorical interpretations the work may inspire. 
II 
It would be difficult to overstate the impact of this Romantic ideology 
of myth upon both popular and scholarly conceptions of it right into our own 
day. In the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years of the 
twentieth, the literary theories I have been tracing thus far seem to mark time 
while fresh thinking about myth develops in the new modes of the human 
sciences, in sociology, anthropology and depth psychology. But these young 
disciplines themselves are affected by the wave of irrationalist thought 
current at the time, in the philosophies of Nietzsche and Bergson, for 
example, and the social thought of Pareto and Weber. These disciplines begin 
to exhibit their own versions of the Romantic ideology of myth, particularly 
in their focus upon the origins of religion and upon "the primitive." When 
Tylor helped to launchmodemanthropologywith the publication of Primitive 
Culture, he intended to support Comte' smetahistorical scheme, according to 
which religion belon~ only to the first stage of human development and the 
kind of religion which generates myth only to the first part of that. By 
devotingsomuchofhistexttomythandreligionheobviouslymeanttostrike 
a blow in the then-current "warfare of science and theology," but within a 
generation these lines of inquiry produce Fraz.er' s Golden Bough and the 
Cambridge Hellenists, Durkheim and Levy-Brohl, in all of whom one finds 
large elements of neo-Romantic irrationalism.9 
The work on myth in these new disciplines creates, in turn, a feedback 
loop into the aesthetics of Modernism The controversial MOMA exhibition 
of a few years ago, with its juxtapositions of "primitive" tribal art and 
celebrated Modernist pieces, was a reminder of the impact of the new 
theorizing upon the visual arts, and one has only to recall T. S. Eliot' srecourse 
to myth in The Waste lAnd, Joyce's in Ulysses, D. H. Lawrence's in his later 
work, Thomas Mann's in Joseph and His Brothers, and so forth, to appreciate 
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the reenergired emergence of Romantic ideology in Modernist literature.10 
Modernist art contributes little of theoretical importance to this ideology, but 
its brilliant successes, especially in combination with its appropriations of 
anthropology and depth psychology, stimulate, in their tum, a new outburst 
of theorizing about myth which peaks around the mid-century. In getting a 
grip on the extent of the survival of Romantic ideology in the twentieth 
century, it may be of help to consider its appearance under the four following 
groupings. 
The first group, both chronologically and in order of importance, is 
Freudian psychoanalysis and its modification, Jungian analytic psychology. 
Hit seems odd to ciasmfy analytic psychology as merely a "modification" of 
psychoanalysis, that is because both Freudians and Jungians have found 
their political interest to lie in stres.5ing differences; with respect to their 
thinking about myth, however, resemblances and continuities are more 
significant. Freud's postulation that the mind is largely repressed and 
censored "primaryprocess" entailsasacorollarythatitislargely a mechanism 
for the production of mythopoesis. The persistent recurrence of comparable 
symbolism in both his patients and in worldwide storytelling led Freud, a 
belated follower of Lamarckian biology, to produce what he himself once 
called his "phylogenetic fantasy," that humankind inherits acquired 
symbolis~ including that derived from the origins of religion and the incest 
taboo in the slaying of the primal father.11 In this work and in the later 
expansion of his theory of the instincts into a full-blown cultural critique, 
Freud constructs a powerful picture of the mind as dominated by mythic 
patterhsof inadvertent symbol. Jung, who was much more frankly under the 
sway of Roman tic poetry and philosophy, transmutes what he called Freud's 
"semiotic" reading of symbols as indicators of the etiology of individual 
neurosis into a "hermeneutic'' reading of symbols as signifiers of a universal 
process whose outcome for the individual possesses a teleological direction 
Qung, 1972, 291). According to Jung's theory of libidinal development, 
mental health depends upon hermeneutical rapport with thesetranspersonal 
"archetypes" of "the collective unconscious."u Mystical as this theory 
sounds, it is reason itself compared to the debased versions of it peddled by 
Jungian epigones like Erich Neumann and Joseph Campbell, to say nothing 
of current gurus like James Hillman and Robert Bly. Thus psychoanalysis 
and analytic psychology pour into the twentieth century through a new 
channel the Romantic ideology of myth and symbol. 
The second such channel is phenomenology of religion. This school of 
thought seems to have been jumpstarted by the remarkable su~ just after 
the First World War of Rudolph Otto's The Idea of the Holy. Otto employs the 
Robertson Smith-Durkheim distinction between the sacred and the profane 
in order to characterize the experience of "the holy." He thus evades the 
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previous generations's obsession with origins, but the result is far from a 
neutral Husserlian account of what seems to be the case; instead, the method 
of phenomenology is employed to dramatiz.e the ontological reality of the 
object intended by the experience. While the best phenomenologists of 
religion, such as Pettazoni, van der Leeuw and Eliade, do not indulge in 
anything so crude, and test their categories in serious comparative studies, 
the gravamen of their expositions tend, like Otto's~ to affirm the truth of 
Romantic myth and symbol. Mircea Eliade' swell-known studies of sacred 
time and space are obvious cases in point 13 A student of myth soon discovers 
that in the United States, at least, departments of religion generate a 
considerable proportion of current mythography and that much of this work 
reflects the values and assumptions of this committed branch of 
phenomenology. · 
The third channel of Romantic thought is the work primarily of literary 
scholars inspired to attempt comprehensive synthetic theories, both by the 
heady successes of the new anthropological and psychological perspectives 
and by the eclat of their adoption by Modernist masters. The two best known 
and most influential of these are Joseph Campbell in The Hero With a Thousand 
Faces and The Masks of God and Northrop Frye in The Anatomy of Criticism and 
subsequent ancillary works.14 The psychology involved is mainly Jungian 
and the anthropology deriyed principally from the connections between 
"myth" and ritual populariz.ed by Fraz.er' s The Golden Bough, the Cambridge 
Hellenists and the subsequent "myth and ritual" branch of comparative 
mythology. It has long been a bit of a scandal that Frazer's work, so 
outmoded as mainstream anthropology, should continue to be revered in 
literary circles. Recent attention to Frazer by intellectual historians and 
historians of anthropology has helped to clarify this peculiar genealogy. 
Frazer appears as the inventor of a powerfully heueristic "comparative 
method," which, byoverridingthescxiallyproduced,historicallyconditioned 
representations of particular times and places, enables the transcendent 
subjects who are its practitioners to synthesiz.e the underlying universal 
meanings of myth.15 Mythographers like Campbell and Frye do also rely on 
versions of the Romantic symbol, but they are probably best understood as 
transmitting Romantic ideology in this broader sense. 
Last, but certainly not least, we find theories of myth a5 symbolic fonn, 
stemming from Ernest Cassirer' s Philosophy of Symbolic Fonns. According to 
Cassirer, following in part the earlier work of Lucien Levy-Bruhl, myth is a 
distinct modality of human thought, on a par with science, or even language 
itself. This theory clearly echoes the stadial metahistories of the Romantics 
and of Hegel and Comte and raises their familiar problems; to what degree, 
for instance, is "mythic thought," outmoded bytheevolutionof conscio~? 
Cassirer suggests ambiguously, as this Hegelian tradition has tended to do 
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in the twentieth century, that the mode survives in art. This is a notion which 
encouraged certain New Critical literary theorists during the 40s and 50s to 
Cl$ume a fonnal analogy between a ritual and a work of art that enables the 
makertocaptureoreveninventa myth. Cassirer' s theory connects with New 
Critical thinking in yet another way, via Suzanne Langer who gaveCassirer' s 
"symbolic fonn" a lingi$tic tum in Philosophy in a New Key. New Critical 
theory insisted, in a striking development of Kantian aesthetics, that the 
essence of what distinguishes literature from non-literature must bea quality 
of language itself, and we find a theorist like Philip Wheelwright, for 
example, extending this quality of "intension" to the "mythic'' as well. For 
Wheelwright, properly literary language is myth. 
Thus far I have attempted to summari7.e the hegemony of Romantic 
assumptions in modern thinking about myth. But the history of this topic 
ever since the Enlightemrient is a history of dialectical alternations between 
what Hegel famously analyred in his Phenomenology of the Spirit as 
''EnlightenmentandSuperstition"(561-589)orwhatHorkheimerandAdomo 
revealingly recast in the 1940s as ''Enlightenment and Myth." Even in the 
nineteenth century the Romantic glorification of myth as a means to 
transcendence, sacred or secular, provoked in opposition three major 
''henneneutics of suspicion," those of Marx, Nietzsche arid Freud.16 Marx's 
is the most exemplary, since it includes the articulation of the very concept 
of ideology. Ideology is, of course, a tenn at least as popularly abused and 
as contested these days as myth itself.17 Since Marx did create its modern 
notoriety by applying it to what I have been calling "Romantic" and he called 
"German" ideology, perhaps it can be described provisionally here as the 
dialectical contrary of the Romantic claim that a mythology is a set of beliefs 
around which a culture coheres. View that assumption as true, but view it 
with hostile dread instea':i of nostalgic satisfaction, and you get ideology. 
Unlike Marx, both Nietzsche and Freud also rontributed to the Romantic 
valorizing of "myth." Freud's contribution I have already discussed. 
Nietzsche's lies in the impact 9f the early Birth ofTragedyupon the Cambridge 
Hellenists and Modernist writers by virtue of its pioneering, if rather lurid, 
insights into the prehistoric ritual foundations of Greek culture. But this 
Romantic strain, disproportionate to its occasion as it was, is far outweighed 
by Nietzsche's mature henneneutics of resenbnent, the way he has taught us 
to scan the dominant cultilral representations of Western humanist thought 
for signs of its will to power. So, too, Freud's renovation of the Romantic 
symbol is far outweighed by his henn.eneutics of desire, the way he has 
taught us to penetrate to the conflicts between libido and culture concealed 
beneath the structures of socializ.ed behavior. 
In the past fifty years these three founding "hennene~tics of suspicion" 
have reappeared, aggrandized, in Frankfurt critical theory and in 
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poststructuralism. The effect of these critiques upon the concept of "myth" 
has been to expand it into a virtual synonym for ideology. Hence Roland 
Barthes conceives of "mythologies'' as semiotic distortions in popular culture 
and Jacques Derrida proposes a "mythologie blanche" inscri~ everywhere in 
the foundational metaphors of Western philosophy, to which we whites are 
nevertheless so blind that these tropes might as well be written in invisible 
ink. As a result of the rise of National Socialism in Germany Ernst Cassirer 
himself turns on myth, viewing with horror its reemergence in the modern 
West as atavistic political propaganda (Cas.5irer, 1946). Even common 
language usage confirms this negative view of the concept; "myth" is 
ordinarily employed to signify a widely believed lie. When I remarked near 
the beginning of this essay that many tcxlay would identify myth with a 
composite of Bacon's four '~idols," it was this climate I had in mind. 
It would be misleading, however, to leave the impression that the 
valorizing of myth which is the legacy of Romanticism has been banished 
from the current field of cultural representatio~ low or high. We can confirm 
that the former is not the case by observing in virtually any bookstore these 
days the array of works by Joseph Cambell, usually located near the checkout 
counter. And the pressure of poststructuralistcritiquesof "essentialism" has 
produced impressively sophisticated counterresponses which take them 
into dialogue. Such theories are ronfident of the· constitutive power of 
language, like Hazard Adams' Philosophy of the Literary Symbolic, or the late 
work of Paul Ricoeur on a deferred but ultimately attainable symbolism of 
presence, or the literary theory of Eric Gould which finds the essence of what 
he finally names "mythidty'' in the endless play of language "in the gap 
between event and meaning'' (10).18 In fact, although suspicion of myth is 
currently modish in academic circles, this suspicion is still locked, as it has 
been since the days of Hegel, in dialectical struggle with its adversary. I call 
the contest dialectical because the antithetical critiques of suspicio~ too, 
accept tacitly as the basis of their negation the humanistic or Romantic 
assumption that "myth" signifies nothing less broad and fundamental than 
the power of the human mind to ronstructmeaninginitsownrepresentations. 
m 
Perhaps one can best measure the presence even in twentieth-century 
thought of Romantic ideas about myth (and their antithetical counterparts) 
by contrasting them with the findings of modern anthropology. The greatest 
post-Romantic innovation in the study of myth has been the systematic study 
in the field of the actual religious beliefs and practices of preliterate peoples. 
Only after World War I and the great shift in intellectual fashion from focus 
on origins to focus on structures, did anthropology thus examine myth 
systematically outside the terms set by Romantic ideology. And the upshot 
. . 
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of thisexaminationhas beenanincreasingronsensus that there is surprisingly 
little there. 
This is a hyperbolic way of saying that dominant trends in British and 
Americananthropologyhaveconduced tothedissolutionofmyth,regarded 
as a separate entity, in~ broader sociological CC?nsiderations. In British 
anthropology the varieties of what may for convenience be loosely labelled 
"functionalism" encouraged a Durkheimian identification of religion with 
social behavior. The ronsequences for our understanding of myth may be 
illustrated by Malinowski's historically important Frazer Lecture of 1926, 
''Myth in Primitive Psychology," the same piece in which he marks his 
difference from Fraz.er by famously contrasting his openirir fieldwork with 
"the closed study of the theorist" (99). According to Malinowski, myth is 
neitherprimarilycognitive(as.Tylor and evenFraz.ersupposed),nor affective 
and "artistic" (asRomanticthoughtwouldhaveit),but"a pragmatic charter'' 
with indispensable quotidian functions: "it expresses, enhances and codifies 
belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of 
ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man (101)." This same 
view of myth as pragmatic and quotidian pervades such classics of British 
functionalism as Evans-Pritchard' s work on the Azande and Nuer. No one 
could accuse Evans-Pritchard of neglecting the religion of the peoples he 
studied,oreventhetheoreticsof"primitivereligion,"yetheseldommentions 
myth and it nowhere appears as a significant topic in its own right.19 Myth 
issubsumed,asitisinDurkheim,underritualbehavior,ontheonehand,and 
concepts of belief on the other. 
In the United States the influence of Franz Boas and his students 
produced a similar result bydifferentmeans. It may seem perverse to impute 
the elimination of myth~ a man who did so much. to promote the collection 
of Native American story and whose ethnographical masterpiece is called 
TsimshianMythology. Boas' employmentoftheword "mythology," introduces, 
however,a problematic central to my argument. Anyone who has examined 
his massive tome will know that it rontains scarcely two pages of what would 
pass in Romantic circles as myth; by Romantic standards, it is a compendium 
of folktales. The tripartite generic distinctions among "myth," '1egend" and 
"tale" given currency by the Grimm Brothers, and popularized by Victorian 
handbooks like Bulfinch, imply the full Romantic ideology; folktales are only 
miirchen,fairytales, whereasmythsarestoriesaboutdivinitieswhichronstitute 
significant fragments of the mythology around which a culture roheres.20 
Boas subverts this distinction by adopting a criterion derived from his native 
infonnants;mythsarestoriessetina stateof theworld beforethepresentone, 
while tales belong to time as we know it now. By this standard Boas is 
justified in calling "myth" a largemassofTsimshianstories which nineteenth-
century folklorists would.have called "tales." Boas' legacy of this distinction 
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is a dangerous one, however, because it depends upon local definition. 
Where his students did not find tribal corroboration they fell back upon 
whatever seemed to be the particular case. Hence Boas' ultimate impact on 
this feature of Native American ethnography has been the extension of the 
term "myth" to all traditional oral narrative. 
Claude Levi-Stra~ provides a gocxi, if extreme, case in point. One 
might think of him casually as the person who has done more than anyone 
since Boas himself to stimulate the study of Amerindian myth. But a 
moment' sreflection will show that he hascarried Boas' positivisticdestruction 
of the Romantic categories of genre to one, at least of its logical ronclusions. 
Not only does he insist on the identity of myth and tale, but his canonical 
formula for myth also all~ws the derivation of ~e terms of its fonnal 
analogies, particularly the inverted fourth ~ from any semiological 
aspect of the culture, including rites, masks and body-painting. Any concept 
encoded semiologicallymayserveasa ''mytheme," then, once it is abstracted 
from narrative. It would be difficult to imagine a more severe reduction of 
humanist or Romanticclaimsformythas the special vehicle of transcendence 
than this dismissal of teller, audience, context and even~ itself on the 
grounds that myths are networks of mediating concepts that "operate in 
men's minds without their being aware of the fact" (Levi-Strauss, 1969, 12). 
Nor does the relative revival in the last twenty-five years of 
anthropological investigations of religion seem to offer any reversal of this 
unwillingne$ to hypostatiz.e "myth." For Gifford Geertz, as for ~t 
~irer, myth is a mode of "significant symbol" on a par with language, art 
and ritual, but Geertz explicitly rejects Cassirer's "taking symbols to be 
identical with or 'constitutive of their referents" (a virtual definition of 
Romantic symbol) and does not mention myth at all in his "interpretive" 
studies of Javanese and Balinese religion (Geertz, 92). Studies of religion by 
the symbolist wing of anthropology, which generally views belief and 
practice as affective and non-logical, might be expected to be soft on myth. 
But significant studies by Edmund Leach, Mary Douglas and Victor Turner 
in fact eschew it. Leach and Douglas focus instead upon the structural 
relations of symbol and Turner entirely upon ritual proces.5.21 The roncept of 
"symbol" has acquired in the past two centuries an extremely vexed 
problematic of its own, in nlany respects parallel to that of myth and in some 
respectsoverlap~inrontrast to "the Romantic symbol," however, virtually 
the entire range of its usage in anthropology, as in the other social sciences, 
lies finnly within the positivist semantics descended from C. S. Pierce and 
well outside any truck with transcendence. Even a recent constructivist like 
Roy Wagner, who goes so far as to see "myth" along with ~hip systems 
and ritual as one of the ''basic frames of culture ... fonned as large-scale 
tropes," presents a wholly secular theory of the constitutive meaning of 
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symbols (129). In short Romantic asmnnptions seldom appear even in the 
anthropological thought most sympathetic to myth. The severity of this 
reduction recalls Levi-Strauss' persuasive argument ~t the once potent 
concept of totemism is largely what Whitehead would call a fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness. Modern anthropology seeIM to have gone far 
toward establishing that the same is true of much that has passed as myth. 
This anthropological shrinkage of swollen Romantic pretensions has 
much to teach everyone still minded to use the term "myth." Concreteness 
is fallacious only when located at the wrong level. Since we cannot expect 
either the word or the concept to disappear, "myth" had best be placed as 
precisely as possible. I believe our best recourse is to accept and build upon 
the anthropological demolition of the Romantic distinction between myth 
and tale. In the beginning is the tale. But how then, the reader may object, 
are we to understand Boas' discovery,sooftenrepeated,asitis by Malinowski 
in ''Myth in Primitive Psychology," that preliterate peoples themselves make 
this generic distinction? My answer is that either the ethnologists or their 
informants or both may have fallen into another fallacy of misplaced 
concretenes.5. There is a great deal of anthropological evidence that the 
realms of the sacred and~ profane, in terms of ~tive, as in terms of all 
other fonns of behavior, are distinguished not so much by modes as by 
moods. The existence of "sacred narrative," which I consider the best term 
for what Boas, following his informants, labelled "myth," is a widespread 
cultural fact.22 But sacred narrative is merely tale, told in ritual circumstances 
and religious mood. This simplification may help explain why ethnologists 
so often disrover that the allegedly esoteric myth of a sotjety is the familiar, 
exoteric possession even of its women and children. 1be proper generic 
distinction lies, then, not between a genre called "myth" which channels 
transcendence and one called "tale" which is merely secular and mundane 
entertainment, but rather between tale which is employed in a religious 
context and tale which is not. 
Thisclaimmustmeetasecond empirical objection, that sacred narratives 
are often much more than simple folktales; they are profound expressions of 
the matrix of assumptions basic toa particular culture. My reply is that sacred 
narrative begins in folktale but builds upon it; the religious mood in which 
such a tale is told guarantees that over time the tale will attract to itself a rich 
panoply of the culture's ideology.23 This ethnologically-based distinction 
between myth and ideology helps explain both why poststructuralists and 
critical theorists have been tempted to identify the two, and why it is a 
mistake to do so. Tribal consciousness of the ideological freight of sacred 
story may also be an ancillary reason for the prevalence of indigenous 
distinctions between myth and tale. In any case, many anthropologists will 
undoubtedly continue to employ the now customary word "myth" to 
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designate such sacred narrative. This is a practice hannl~ enough within 
circles where, as we have ~ myth and tale have come to be generally 
identified, but it is a practice which sows confusion outside the discipline, 
where victims of the RonKlll:tic ideology continue to ~d into the word more 
lurid implications. 
Finally, the check to Romantic pretensions inherent in modern 
anthropological fieldwork needs to be brought to bear upon the kind of 
literary studies of myth which have been popular since Fraz.er and the 
succ~of Modernism in the arts. Studies like ''Mythic Patterns inSmeddle's 
Descent Into HelY' purport to discover or examine the quality of "mythidty'' 
in the literary productions of Western culture. I believe that the same account 
of myth which applies to preliterate cultures applies to outs; myth is tale 
elaborated ideologically. From this point of view the behavior of the modern 
scholar who produces such a study is the equivalent of one of Boas' 
Tsimshian writing a learned commentary which expatiates upon the ideology 
of his neighbor's recent retelling of a sacred narrative. This comparison 
indicates two respects in which the general rule requires qualification when 
applied to thatcuriousentitycalled ''Western culture;'' first, that by virtue of 
its long prehistoric development such tale is already heavily elaborated 
whenitentershistorical culture and, second, that '1iterature" isanincreasingly 
secularized analogue of sacred narrative. 1be German cultural historian 
Hans Blumenberg has in mind the first of these two qualifications when he 
distinguishes between the work of myth, in preliterate cultures, and work on 
myth in literate ones. Blumenberg' s extensive demonstrations of how such 
"work on myth" accumulates establish, in my opinion, that such "work" is 
really a branch of literary ciµusion. In order to acco.unt for the mysterious 
perennial appeal of certain myths, the stories of Oedipus or Prometheus for 
example, Blumenberg borrows from gestalt psychology the concept of 
Priignanz, "pregnance" or "imprintedness." But the peculiar attraction of 
such stories may be accounted for more simply, in keeping with the principle 
of Occam's razor, by what I have called ideological elaboration; the more 
intensively a tale has been worked into the fabric of a culture, the more likely 
it is to be worked further-and the more mysterious will seem the sources of 
its appeal. I do not mean to suggest that such internal elaboration of a 
culture's own myths is undesireable; it appears inevitable and may even be 
useful, as as would surely have been the case if a learned Tsimshian could 
have produced a commentary on the tales Boas collected. As I think the 
genealogy of the modem construction of myth demonstrates, however, what 
wouldbedesireableis thattheliterarypromoterof mythapproachitrecognizing 
that its special appeal is built upon its ideological entrenchment, rather than 
hoping to find there the Other of Western secularism, the route to religious 
transcendence, or the ground of the substantive self as synthesiz.er of truth. 
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Notes 
1 In order to avoid setting off "myth" in quotation marks each time it appears, 
I ask that the reader take for granted their implied presence in all uses of the term. 
2 Feldman and Richardson, p. 10. Like everyone who has worlc.ed in the past 
twenty years on eighteenth century and Romantic mythography I owe much to the 
translations, notes and introductions in this distinguished anthology. 
3 The best scholarly account of this topos of "dissociation" remains Kermode, 
pp. 139-161. 
• Schiller published two versions of the poe~ the first in 1788, seven years 
before "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry" (1795) and the stronger, revised version 
which I use here in 1800, five years after the essay; thus the two versions of the poem 
neatly bracket the prose exposition. 
5 I have in mind particularly Fabian, Stocking and Kuper. 
6 I have been most directly affected, perhaps, by McGann, Lacoue-Labartheand 
Nancy and Bernstein. 
7 For "internalized quest romance" see Bloom, pp. 3-24. 
8 Two excellent recent accounts of the Romantic symbol," both of which have 
seived as partial models for my history of myth, are Todorov and Adams. 
9 This assertion may seem odd in the case of Frazer, who presents himself as a 
Tylorian rationalist and appears to maintain a "cognitive" position about the nature 
of magic and religion, but recent work on The Golden Bough as text unveils many of 
its neo-Romantic assumptions and helps account for its continued appeal in literary 
circles. See especially, in Manganaro, the editor's introduction, pp. 21-23 and the 
essays in the anthology's first section, ''Frazer: Textual Reevaluations," pp. 51-130. 
10 The ethnographic significance of the MOMA exlubition of pp. ~, 
"'Primitivism' in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the TnDal and the Modem," is the 
subject of two recent lively studies; Oifford, pp. 189-21~ and Torgovnik, pp. 119-
137. 
11 See Freud. Freud employed the phrase "phylogenetic fantasy" in a letter to 
Ferenczi in 1915, first printed in Jones an, p . 312). 
12 By far the best text of Jung's for grasping his theory of libidinal development, 
and probably the most intellectually significant of his prolific career is his first, 
Transformations and Symbo~ of Libido (1912), particularly as revised in 1952 and 
renamed Symbols of Transformation after he had articulated fully his concepts of "the 
collective unconscious" and "archetype." See Jung 1956. 
13 I have in mind Eliade 1961 and 1963 rather than the later History of Religious 
Ideas. 
14 On the level of generalization attempted here it makes sense to link Campbell 
and Frye, but the association should not be taken to imply that their work is of equal 
value; Frye's bears seriously upon literary theory, as Campbell's does not. It should 
~so be ~oted, with respect to my next sentence, that Frye explicitly dismisses Jung's 
collectiveunconscious" as "an unnecessaryhypothesisinliterarycriticism' (p.112). 
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The case for his being neverthel~ deeply influenced by Jung can be made only at 
length. 
15 I wish tothankMarcM~ganaroforpermittingme~readaclarifyingportion 
of his manusaipt fortha>ming from Yale University Press, on the genealogy of this 
"'comparative method." 
1
' The label ~ermeneutics of suspicion"' for these modes of criticizing the 
dominant Western culture was invented by Paul Ricoeur. See Ria>elll' 1970, pp. 32-
3.S. These "hermeneutics" wereprovoked,of rourse, byarongeriesof oven:letermined 
causes,notmerelybytheRomanticglorificationofm~howeverbroadlyunderstood. 
17 It is employed in more than one sense in this very essay. There are numerous 
important studies of the roncept from various angles, but for useful general guides 
see Larrain, Geuss and F.agleton. 
11 For Ricoeur's explicit acknowledgment that his later work on metaphor, 
interpretation theory and narrative depends upon a theological guarantee of 
meaning, see especially Riroeur 1970, pp. 494-5.Sl and Ricoeur 1978, pp. 223-238. 
19 For Evans-Pritchard on "'primitive religio~" see 1965. In Evans-Pritchard 
1956, for example, "'myth" is not even indexed. 
20 The most useful survey of this tripartite Romantic distinction of genres is 
Bascom, although, as a folklorist, he is interested in refining and preserving the 
distinctions. 
21 Brian Morris' excellent study provides a useful overview of recent work on 
religion by these and other significant anthropological thinkers (Morris pp.182-328). 
22 I borrow the term "sacred narrative' from the title of the folklorist, Alan 
Dundes' recent anthology of the theory of myt~ though he himself employs the 
phrase to characteriz.e myth as distinguished from tale (Dundes). 
23 Many constructivist tlteories of language and symbol as constitutive of 
meaning, Adams' in literary theory and Wagner's in symbolic anthropology, for 
example, seem to converge to suggest this conception of how tale accumulates 
ideology. I have found particularly instructive, and promising for future studies of 
the process, Liszke's semiological study. 
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